University of Technology Sydney

23998 Research in Mechanism Design

Warning: The information on this page is indicative. The subject outline for a particular session, location and mode of offering is the authoritative source of all information about the subject for that offering. Required texts, recommended texts and references in particular are likely to change. Students will be provided with a subject outline once they enrol in the subject.

Subject handbook information prior to 2024 is available in the Archives.

UTS: Business: Economics
Credit points: 0 cp

Subject level:

Postgraduate

Result type: Pass fail, no marks

There are course requisites for this subject. See access conditions.
Anti-requisite(s): 23978 Research in Mechanism Design

Description

This subject studies various topics in mechanism design focusing on how institutions should be designed for satisfactory outcomes when information is dispersed and not publicly observable.

Subject learning objectives (SLOs)

Upon successful completion of this subject students should be able to:
1. Understand advanced theoretical models of mechanism designs
2. Modify existing (or develop new) models, and apply theory to determine their theoretical performance
3. Use the technical skills developed throughout the course to knowledgeably read contemporary research on mechanism design

Contribution to the development of graduate attributes

This subject enables students to develop a comprehensive knowledge in a field of study. More specifically, it contributes to the development of the following graduate attributes:

  • Business knowledge and concepts
  • Critical thinking and analytical skills
  • Business practice oriented skills

Teaching and learning strategies

The subject will be taught using a combination of lectures and tutorials. There is no course textbook.

Content (topics)

  • Mechanism design under IPV
  • Mechanism design under interdependent value and correlated types
  • Dynamic Mechanism Design
  • Sequential screening
  • Contest Design
  • Mechanism Design with Aftermarket dynamics
  • Bayesian Persuasion

Minimum requirements

Students must achieve at least 50% of the subject’s total marks

Required texts

There is no required textbook.

Recommended texts

  1. Börgers, Tilman, with a chapter by Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz. 2015. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design. Oxford University Press.
  2. Krishna, Vijay. 2009. Auction Theory, 2ed. Academic Press.
  3. Mas-Colell, Andreu, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green. 1995. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press.
  4. Haeringer, Guillaume. 2018. Market Design: Auctions and Matching. The MIT Press.